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Abstract 
This paper challenges a common assumption about decision- 
making mechanisms in humans: decision-making is a 
distinctively high-level cognitive activity implemented by 
mechanisms concentrated in the higher-level areas of the 
cortex. We argue instead that human behavior is controlled by 
a multiplicity of highly distributed, heterarchically organized 
decision-making mechanisms. We frame it in terms of control 
mechanisms that procure and evaluate information to select 
activities of controlled mechanisms and adopt a phylogenetic 
perspective, showing how decision-making is realized in 
control mechanisms in a variety of species. We end by 
discussing this picture's implication for high-level cognitive 
decision-making. 
Keywords: decision-making; phylogenetic refinement; 
heterarchical networks; hypothalamus; basal ganglia 
Introduction 
We advance a heterarchical alternative to the hierarchical 
conception of decision-making common in cognitive science 
and neuroscience. Decision-making is classically construed, 
following our folk psychological understanding of explicit 
reasoning and decision-making, as distinctively human. 
According to this conception, roughly: (1) decision-making 
is a higher-level, cognitive activity, implemented by a unified 
neural mechanism in the prefrontal cortex (Gold & Shadlen, 
2007); (2) this mechanism is situated between the perception 
and motor mechanisms, taking inputs from the former and 
sending output to the latter (Hurley, 2001); (3) decision-
making is conscious in that we are aware of the alternative 
options, evaluative criteria, and the process of selection; and 
finally, (4) it is a deliberate, rather than automatic, activity 
(Gonzalez, 2017).  
This classical conception has proven contentious and been 
subject to criticisms by theorists adopting a variety of 
theoretical frameworks in recent literature. For example: 
massive modularists argue that there are multiple reasoning 
modules, rather than a unified mechanism (Carruthers, 2008). 
Also, decision scientists have fruitfully applied the decision-
theoretical framework to study lower-level sensorimotor and 
affective mechanisms (Glimcher & Fehr, 2014). Likewise, 
neuroscientists have recognized the important role of 
subcortical components, such as the basal ganglia and 
thalamus, in decision-making (Delgado & Tricomi, 2011). 
Finally, the dual-process theories have argued for the 
existence of unconscious and automatic decisions, while their 
critics question the dichotomy between the conscious and 
deliberate vs. the unconscious and automatic decisions 
(Evans & Frankish, 2009). 
Nevertheless, these debates still operate under a 
hierarchical framework that views the multiplicity of 
decision-making mechanisms as arranged on various levels 
with the most "cognitive" decision-making situated at the 
top-level and the sensory and motor ones at the lower-levels. 
More importantly, the lower-level decision-making 
mechanisms are, adopting Daniel Dennett's term, 
bureaucratic (Dennett, 1991) They function to provide 
information for the cognitive decision-making mechanisms 
and work out the detailed implementation of their decisions. 
As a result, there are no real conflicts between lower-level 
and higher-level decisions, since the lower-level mechanisms 
do not have their own agenda and function solely to serve 
those of the higher-level ones.  
In defending a heterarchical alternative, we argue that 
cognitive scientists should adopt a much broader perspective 
on decision-making, one that recognizes it as a ubiquitous 
and widely distributed activity in all living organisms, even 
those that do not have neurons. We apply a similar distributed 
perspective to humans, arguing that human behaviors are the 
product of decision-making mechanisms that are (1) radically 
distributed in cortical, subcortical, and peripheral regions of 
the nervous system; (2) opportunistically structured in 
heterarchical networks and autonomous, instead of 
bureaucratic. (The notion of heterarchy was introduced by 
McCulloch, 1945.) Neglecting these leads to an over-
intellectualized account of human decision-making. The 
heterarchical framework draws on the insights from 
distributed and embodied cognition (Clark, 1997) and is 
compatible with their stronger versions that view cognition 
as constituted by processes in the body or in the environment; 
however, we remain neutral on these stronger positions in this 
paper.  
In making our case, we are, in significant part, inspired by 
the phylogenetic approach to cognition advanced by Cisek 
(2019). Cisek argues for understanding cognitive capacities 
as the product of phylogenetic refinement. On this view, 
cognitive traits exhibited in organisms earlier in our 
phylogeny are still operative in us. Our cognitive abilities 
build upon these capacities but are also constrained by them. 
He contends that by examining cognition from this 
perspective, we are more likely to identify the processes 
underlying our abilities: "Ideally, that new taxonomy will 
progressively differentiate functions and subfunctions in a 
way that mirrors their progressive differentiation over 
evolutionary time, and the hope is that the resulting set of 
explananda will more naturally correspond to real biological 
circuits." There is no space in a short paper to fully develop a 
phylogeny of decision-making mechanisms. Instead, we 
focus selectively on examples from that phylogeny that 
motivate developing a more distributed perspective on 
decision-making.  
In the next section, we advance a theoretical perspective on 
decision-making that provides a basis for understanding how 
evaluations enter the diverse mechanisms that organisms use 
to make decisions. We then turn to decision-making in 
organisms without neurons, which provides a perspective on 
how decision-making mechanisms arose in phylogeny. Next, 
we consider decision-making in organisms with nervous 
systems but without a central brain to illustrate how decision-
making can be distributed throughout a nervous system 
before taking up decision-making in bilateral invertebrate 
nervous systems. Finally, we turn to vertebrates and show 
that even as a great deal of neural processing is concentrated 
in a brain, decision-making remains highly distributed.  
A Framework for Decision-Making 
In approaching the phylogeny of decision-making, we need 
to be clear what is required to identify a process as making 
decisions. It is not enough that a mechanism randomly selects 
between alternatives. Decision-making involves evaluating 
alternatives and selecting one of them based on the 
evaluation. In explicit decision-making, the grounds for 
evaluations can be explicitly represented (e.g., as utility 
assessments) and reported. Our contention is that explicit 
decisions account for only a small percentage of the decisions 
that humans make. For example, humans do not consciously 
evaluate the options when deciding whether and what to eat, 
to adjust their posture, or to engage in social pleasantries.  
To see how evaluations figure in decisions that are not the 
product of conscious deliberation, it is helpful to view 
decision-making as an activity of control mechanisms—
mechanisms that operate on other mechanisms as to affect 
when and how they operate. The various activities of living 
systems—metabolism, growth, locomotion, reproduction, 
etc.—are performed by production mechanisms. The new 
mechanists in philosophy of science have described how 
scientists in a host of life sciences develop explanations by 
identifying the production mechanism responsible for a given 
phenomenon and decomposing it into its parts, operations, 
and organization (Machamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000; 
Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005). They have, however, largely 
neglected the fact that biological mechanisms, far more than 
human-made machines, are subject to being altered by 
control mechanisms. Since organisms are far-from-
equilibrium and subject to processes that lead to their 
decomposition, it is critical that they deploy production 
mechanisms as needed to build and maintain themselves or 
reproduce (Moreno & Mossio, 2014). Not surprisingly, then, 
biological organisms include a vast number of control 
mechanisms, far outnumbering production mechanisms. 
For one mechanism to control another, it must both be able 
to act on the other to change its operation and to procure and 
evaluate information about whether conditions are 
appropriate for its operation. Information is procured either 
by the control mechanism making measurements or taking 
advantage of the outputs of other mechanisms that carry 
information about the measured quantity. The design of the 
control mechanism determines how it will behave in light of 
this information—altering conditions in production 
mechanisms or not. A simple example of a feedback control 
mechanism makes this clear. A thermostat measures the 
temperature and sends a command to the furnace that makes 
changes in the furnace that alters its functioning.  
In its activity, a control mechanism makes an evaluation: 
in sending a command to the furnace, the thermostat is 
evaluating the current temperature as too low. In the case of 
the thermostat, the evaluation it makes is determined by its 
design and the human user who sets the desired temperature. 
This, however, does not take away the fact that the 
thermostat, once set, itself makes the evaluation and selects 
an action accordingly. A significant difference in living 
organisms is that there is no external agent fixing the 
evaluation procedure in control mechanisms. A given control 
mechanism in an organism is either already equipped with its 
settings as a result of evolution and development, or is acted 
upon by yet another control mechanism that imposes settings 
on it.  
Control mechanisms are introduced opportunistically into 
biological organisms over the course of evolution—if a 
control mechanism arises through variation in existing 
organisms and the organism is overall successful in 
reproducing, it is retained. There are typically many different 
control mechanisms operating on any given production 
mechanism, registering different conditions relevant to the 
deployment of the production mechanism and making 
decisions about when and how the production mechanism 
will be deployed. These are not organized hierarchically but 
heterarchically, with multiple control mechanisms exercising 
control both on production mechanisms and each other.  
Control mechanisms draw upon information and select 
between alternatives. They are, thus, making decisions in the 
sense we adopt in this paper. From this perspective, decision-
making is a ubiquitous activity that is widely distributed in 
organisms. One might object that this perspective cheapens 
the notion of decision-making. We contend, however, that 
control mechanisms embody its central features—employing 
an evaluation procedure to select actions in response to 
information. In the last section, we will suggest how 
recognizing this enables us to better understand explicit 
decision-making that is perhaps uniquely human.  
Decision-Making Without Neurons 
Given this framework, we should expect to identify 
decision-making activities in all living organisms, not just 
those with a nervous system. Indeed, there are plentiful 
examples that have already been investigated. Here, we 
discuss just one. E. coli employs a relatively simple 
mechanism for locomotion—flagella that form into a bundle 
and drive the bacterium forward when they are rotated 
counter-clockwise but separate and allow the bacterium to 
tumble when rotated clockwise. The decision to move 
forward or to tumble is made by a chemical mechanism that 
integrates information from five transmembrane proteins that 
detect various chemicals in the external and internal 
environment. When this sensing mechanism registers that the 
concentration of nutrients is declining or that of toxins is 
increasing, it initiates a phosphorylation cascade. When the 
final component, CheY, is phosphorylated, it acts on the 
motor, causing it to rotate clockwise, thereby allowing the 
bacterium to move forward rather than tumble (Falke & 
Piasta, 2014). Individual bacteria exhibit variants in the 
numbers of different receptor types, resulting in different 
decisions. Further, bacteria also appear to adjust the 
percentage of different receptors depending on the presence 
of other bacteria (Sourjik & Wingreen, 2012).  
Although this control mechanism is relatively simple, it 
suffices to enable bacteria to select actions based on 
information collected and evaluation procedures realized in 
the mechanism—that is, it is a decision-making mechanism.  
Moreover, this is just one of many decision-making 
mechanisms in bacteria. Others make decisions affecting the 
social interactions of bacteria in biofilms so as to distribute 
food between organisms at the periphery and those at the 
center of the biofilm (Prindle et al., 2015). Some decisions, 
such as whether to reduce one's body to a spore, have major 
consequences for the lineage of bacteria (Stephens, 1998).  
What is important for our purposes is that each such 
decision is made by a separate control mechanism, 
illustrating the radically distributed nature of decision-
making in single-cell organisms. This distribution of 
decision-making is maintained in multi-cell organisms.  
Decision-Making Without a Central Brain 
A distinctive feature of animal life, at least since the 
Eumetazoa-Bilateria split, is the use of neurons in control 
mechanisms. There has been considerable speculation and 
theorizing about the origins of neurons. All organisms living 
today are the product of a long history of evolution, but many 
theorists regard modern Cnidarians (a phylum comprising 
jellyfish, corals, sea anemones, and other soft-bodied polyps) 
as most reflective of organisms with neurons before the 
evolution of bilateral organisms. A distinctive feature of 
Cnidarians is the occurrence of a network of sensory and 
ganglion neurons situated next to contractile epithelial cells 
constituting the bell. These have been characterized as 
constituting a skin brain (Holland, 2003; Keijzer, van Duijn, 
& Lyon, 2013), which enables coordinated contractions 
required for swimming. 
In the process of carrying out the activity of coordinating 
contractions, these neurons integrate inputs from a variety of 
further control mechanisms and alter behavior in response. 
This is illustrated in Aglantha digitale, a small transparent 
jellyfish with 60-80 tentacles containing muscles that extend 
from around the lower margin of the bell. Fourteen distinct 
neural control mechanisms, each making decisions leading to 
different behaviors, have been identified (Mackie, 2004). 
 To illustrate how these control mechanisms make 
decisions, we focus on the capacity of Aglantha to decide 
between two distinct modes of swimming, slow and escape 
(Mackie, 1980). In both cases, the contractions of the bell are 
directly controlled by neurons in the nerve net, but the 
activity of these neurons is modulated by those in the inner 
of two nerve rings that circumvent the margin of the bell. In 
slow swimming, these ring neurons serve as a pacemaker, 
which modulates the nerves in the nerve net to generate slow, 
regular contractions (Mackie, 2004; Satterlie, 2018). Escape 
swimming is initiated by the same ring neurons when they 
are induced by mechanical or electrical stimulation of the 
tentacles, resulting in much stronger muscle contractions 
(Arkett, Mackie, & Meech, 1988). Another control 
mechanism also operates on these ring neurons: default slow 
swimming is briefly inhibited with the initiation of feeding. 
Mackie, Meech, and Spencer (2012) investigated this 
circuitry in another Cnidarian species, Polyorchis 
penicillatus, from which it was easier to record. They 
established that when food is encountered, an electrical pulse 
is transmitted along a nerve plexus to inhibit the pacemaker 
ring neurons. Moreover, this is only one of four circuits that 
suffice to inhibit swimming. Each of these circuits results in 
different specific decisions.  
In short, the decision-making mechanisms illustrated do 
not conform to a neat hierarchical structure. Instead, the 
behavior of modern Cnidarians is determined by a 
heterarchical network of distributed decision-making 
mechanisms.  
Decision-Making in a Bilateral Invertebrate 
It might be assumed that in organisms exhibiting bilateral 
symmetry with a brain situated at one end, decisions would 
all be brought under central control. But this is not the case. 
We illustrate this with the example of decision-making in the 
medicinal leech (Hirudo verbena), which must select 
swimming or crawling to move about. The decision is made 
in 21 individual ganglia situated between what are referred as 
the head and tail brains. Within each ganglion,  consisting of 
approximately 400 neurons,  the decision is made through a 
complex dynamical interaction of a subset of the neurons in 
the ganglion (Briggman, Abarbanel, & Kristan, 2005). Since 
different ganglia can make different decisions, coordinated 
behavior in the whole leech is achieved through coupling 
between ganglia. In addition, other factors, such as 
concentrations of serotonin and dopamine, synthesized by 
other control mechanisms, influence the probability of each 
behavior, with serotonin increasing the likelihood of 
swimming and dopamine of crawling (Puhl & Mesce, 2008; 
Crisp & Mesce, 2006).  
In addition, some behavioral decisions, such as feeding, 
inhibit responses to stimuli that would otherwise elicit a 
response (e.g., swimming or crawling) in non-feeding 
animals. In these conditions, the motor response circuitry is 
still capable of eliciting swimming. The inhibition instead 
results when presynaptic terminals of pressure-sensitive 
mechanosensory neurons are prevented from eliciting motor 
responses. Although the details of the process of presynaptic 
inhibition are not known, Gaudry and Kristan (2009) showed 
that the effect can be mimicked by bath application of 
serotonin to the exposed nervous system and negated by 
applying anserine, known to block serotonergic inhibition in 
C. elegans.   
The leech thus illustrates that even in bilateral organisms, 
decision-making mechanisms are highly distributed and 
structured heterarchically. They also illustrate that chemical 
control mechanisms are operative even in systems with 
neurons. 
Decision-Making in Vertebrate Brains 
A notable difference between vertebrates and the other 
organisms discussed above is the presence of the notochord, 
which serves to centralize many control mechanisms in the 
head region. One consequence of this is to bring together 
what Arendt, Tosches, and Marlow (2016) refer to as the 
apical nervous system (which arose at the apical tip of the 
gastrula-shaped ancestors and integrated information about 
body physiology) and the blastoporal nervous system 
(involved in controlling muscle contractility). Although 
different neural processes were thereby collocated in what 
Tosches and Arendt (2013) termed a chimeric brain, they 
were not integrated into one hierarchically organized system. 
Rather, they gave rise to multiple specialized processing 
centers that form a heterarchical network. We focus on two 
regions within that network—the hypothalamus and the basal 
ganglia.  
The hypothalamus is a collection of nuclei that collectively 
regulate a wide spectrum of animal activities, from metabolic 
processes to overt behaviors, often by releasing hormones 
and neuropeptides into the circulatory system via the adjacent 
pituitary gland. To do so, the different nuclei typically 
integrate information from multiple regions of the body. As 
one example, we consider the role of the arcuate nucleus in 
making decisions about feeding and metabolism.  
 The arcuate nucleus is located in the ventral medial 
hypothalamus near the median eminence. As there is no 
blood-brain barrier at this location, neurons in the arcuate 
nucleus can communicate with the rest of the organism using 
hormones. It contains two populations of neurons that 
respond to peripheral signals indicating the state of satiety of 
the organism. Pro-opiomelanocortin (POMC) neurons 
respond to leptin, a peptide released by adipocytes, signaling 
the accumulation of fat. POMC neurons are influential in 
inhibiting feeding behavior: When POMC are knocked out, 
mice exhibit hyperphagia and obesity; when they are 
activated optogenetically, they suppress food intake. 
Neuropeptide Y/agouti-related peptide neurons, on the other 
hand, are inhibited by leptin but activated by ghrelin, a 
peptide synthesized in the stomach that signals a lack of food 
being digested. Acute activation of these neurons results in 
increased food intake (Sohn, 2015; Trivedi, 2014). 
Reciprocal connections between these neurons "determine 
how much an animal will eat" (Leng, 2018). 
This account is highly simplified. The arcuate nucleus 
receives numerous other signals and acts on many other areas 
of the brain. Adipocytes, for example, release about 100 
different proteins besides leptin, some of which also affect 
neurons in the arcuate nucleus. At the same time, other parts 
of the digestive system also release hormones and peptides 
that affect arcuate neurons. Many of these send signals to the 
brainstem and other areas, which then project to the arcuate 
nucleus (Cone & Elmquist, 2015). Moreover, both leptin and 
ghrelin act on other parts of the hypothalamus that also 
exercise control over feeding behavior. For example, leptin 
activates oxytocin neurons in the supraoptic nucleus of the 
hypothalamus at the anticipated time of feeding (Johnstone, 
Fong, & Leng, 2006).  
This sketch suffices to reveal the complexity of feeding 
regulation. Decisions about feeding are made by a 
distributed, heterarchical network of decision-making 
mechanisms that employ both electrical and chemical 
signaling.   
We turn now to the basal ganglia, a network of subcortical 
nuclei. As we noted above, many cognitive scientists now 
recognize the role the basal ganglia play in decision-making. 
We contend, however, that their treatment of the basal 
ganglia is highly selective. The basal ganglia do not merely 
augment cognitive decision-making carried out in the frontal 
cortex; they provide an architecture that is used in 
collaboration with many other brain regions to facilitate 
making a wide range of decisions.  
We begin with what has drawn the attention of researchers 
interested in decision-making to the basal ganglia—the loops 
between cortical areas, the basal ganglia, and the thalamus. 
These loops tend to be highly specific—when inputs to the 
basal ganglia originate in the frontal cortex, outputs project 
back to the same region of the frontal cortex. This allows the 
basal ganglia to act as a control mechanism on the processing 
in these cortical areas.  
It is the architecture of the basal ganglia themselves that 
implicate these loops in decision-making. Inputs arrive at the 
striatum, which is laid out topographically so that inputs from 
the same region often arrive at the same part of the striatum. 
Inputs to the striatum, project through one of two pathways 
to the output regions of the basal ganglia—the substantia 
nigra pars reticulata and the globus pallidus internus. By 
default, neurons in the output regions send out inhibitory 
signals to their targets. When they receive inputs along what 
is known as the indirect pathway, this inhibitory output is 
enhanced. When, however, they received inputs along the 
direct pathway, inhibition is reduced. There is competition 
between input neurons in the striatum to send projections 
along the direct or indirect pathways. Winning the 
competition enables the region from which the input was 
received to be released from inhibition and continue its 
processing while nearby areas are inhibited. The basal 
ganglia thus perform the activity of selecting between 
alternatives—important to making decisions. 
There are two important qualifications to the account we 
just presented: First, much of the attention has been directed 
at loops originating and terminating in the prefrontal cortex 
as this is taken to be the locus of high-level cognitive activity. 
But the basal ganglia perform the function of decision-
making far more broadly. Similar loops originate and 
terminate in other cortical areas, including sensory and motor 
processing areas. The basal ganglia thus contribute to 
perceptual and motor decisions. Additionally, and critical 
from our perspective, similar loops link the basal ganglia to 
many non-cortical brain areas, including mesencephalic (the 
cuneiform nucleus, the pedunculopontine nucleus, and 
surrounding structures) and diencephalic regions that 
sequence commands sent to central pattern generators in the 
brainstem and spinal cord. Through these loops, the basal 
ganglia contribute to decision-making involving these lower-
level brain regions, and can do so potentially independently 
of the cortex. 
To support our contention that the role of the basal ganglia 
figures in decision-making that goes far beyond what it does 
in conjunction with the cortex, we point to two lines of 
research. First, the basal ganglia are found across vertebrates 
from the lamprey to humans, suggesting it was present at the 
root of vertebrate evolution (Stephenson-Jones, Ericsson, 
Robertson, & Grillner, 2012). In lamprey and presumably 
early mammals, the pallium, from which cortex later evolved, 
is small, suggesting that its inputs to the basal ganglia were 
relatively minor and other inputs predominated. This is 
supported by research in the 20th century that showed 
decorticate cats exhibited many locomotor and other 
behaviors of ordinary cats as long as the basal ganglia and 
thalamus were spared. They ate and drank, responded to 
stimuli, groomed themselves, moved about in their 
environment, and made the decisions necessary to engage in 
these activities. Without the basal ganglia and thalamus, 
however, they are unable to initiate these activities (Bard & 
Macht, 1958); Whelan (1996). These two lines of evidence 
point to a central role of the basal ganglia in decision-making 
in a multitude of contexts, not just in coordination with the 
cortex.  
Second, when we look into further details of the basal 
ganglia mechanism, a different, and even more radically 
distributed picture of decision-making emerges. Regions in 
the striatum that figure in loops with the prefrontal cortex also 
receive inputs from many other cortical and non-cortical 
regions, indicating that they integrate diverse information 
when selecting between prefrontal activities (e.g., shifting 
attention). The other relevant fact is that the evaluation 
processes involved in decision-making do not happen 
entirely within the bounds of the basal ganglia. There is no 
evidence that the inputs to the basal ganglia encode the 
content of what is processed in other brain areas. Rather, the 
strength of the signals received on the various inputs to the 
striatum reflects evaluations already performed in the various 
cortical and non-cortical areas that contribute inputs. That is, 
the basal ganglia merely receive and integrate the evaluations 
to select the strongest options. The relevant decision-making 
systems are composites of the basal ganglia and the brain 
regions from which inputs originate. Thus, even in the cases 
in which the basal ganglia are implicated in decision-making, 
the actual decision-making mechanism is a radically 
distributed network of component mechanisms.     
To sum up, the basal ganglia are central to many decision-
making activities, whether in collaboration with cortex or not. 
In cases in which the loops originate and return to the 
prefrontal cortex, they are involved in decisions, such as 
gating and maintaining working memory, that are 
traditionally recognized as "cognitive." But these are only 
some of the decision-making activities in which they are 
involved. And these do not exhaust decision-making in 
vertebrates as we also noted the role of various parts of the 
hypothalamus in decision-making. 
Implications for Studying Human Decisions 
Decision-making is a fundamental activity of all living 
organisms, not just humans. Adopting a phylogenetic 
perspective makes it clear just how radically distributed 
decision-making mechanisms are. Rather than a pyramid 
structure in which all decisions are made by a hierarchy of 
cortical decision-making mechanisms, the phylogenetic 
perspective suggests that many different control mechanisms, 
neural and otherwise, are involved in decision-making. Many 
of these interact with each other in a complex manner, 
resulting in a heterarchical network, not a hierarchy. Ignoring 
these and attributing all decision-making to one mechanism 
seriously misrepresents how humans and other organisms 
make decisions. 
To illustrate the implications of adopting a heterarchical 
framework over a hierarchical one, consider how the two 
frameworks address the phenomenon of weakness of will—
exhibited, for example, when one judges that it is the best to 
refrain from drinking one more glass of wine, but 
nevertheless goes on to drink it. On the hierarchical model of 
the mind, coherence of an agent's behaviors is provided either 
by the single decision-making mechanism or the one at the 
highest level. Because all other "bureaucratic" mechanisms 
function to serve its agenda, there should be no genuine 
conflicts. This makes it challenging to explain weakness of 
will as there is little theoretical resource for accounting for 
the decision to have the drink (Haas, 2018). At best, it must 
be judged to be irrational. 
In contrast, the heterarchical model recognized multiple 
decision-making mechanisms and does not assume coherence 
of decision-making and so of resulting behaviors; instead, 
coherence is something to be achieved (with varying degrees 
of success) by coordinating different, autonomous decision 
mechanisms. The coordination is performed again by various 
control mechanisms, both internal to the organism, as we 
discussed above (Huang, 2017), as well as external, which we 
will touch on briefly soon. Thus, under the heterarchy 
framework, weakness of will and other forms of more subtle 
internal conflicts are explained as resulting from less than 
perfect coordination of the conflicting autonomous decision-
making mechanisms. Of course, the conflicting mechanisms 
usually constrain and coordinate each other to a high degree. 
This is why weakness of will is the exception, rather than the 
norm.  
Some cognitive scientists might acknowledge that 
decision-making is heterarchical but insist that cognitive 
science should still focus only on distinctively human 
decisions. We conclude by identifying two benefits for 
extending the approach to decision-making as we have done 
in this paper. First, once we recognize that all decision-
making mechanisms are control mechanisms, we can explore 
whether there are some shared design principles between 
different decision-making mechanisms as well as differences 
between them that are appropriate for making different types 
of decisions. Second, adopting a concept of decision-making 
that does not privilege explicit reasoning, we are in a better 
position to see, through contrast, the unique features of 
distinctively human decision-making that has been the focus 
of much of cognitive science.  
While all decision-making mechanisms, as control 
mechanisms, must collect, process, and evaluate information, 
they do so in different specialized ways. For example, cortical 
decision mechanisms typically receive their information and 
communicate control signals via fast synaptic transmission 
through highly organized, layered structures. These features 
enable neocortical areas to specialize in tracking relatively 
fast-changing contexts (e.g., the movement of objects), 
extract complex patterns from the inputs (e.g., languages and 
social norms), as well as produce appropriate control signals 
in response to them. On the other hand, hypothalamic control 
mechanisms collect, among others, chemical signals released 
from a wide range of bodily sources through the circulatory 
system; and they often broadcast their control chemically. 
Due to the relatively slower transmission, they often 
specialized in tracking regularities that change more slowly, 
such as daily cycles in the environment and hunger, but 
regulate a wider range of targets in response to them.      
One dramatic form of specialization is realized when 
humans make decisions based on explicitly represented 
information and norms. As developed in interactionist 
accounts of explicit reasoning (Heyes, 2018) explicit 
representation allows people to communicate the reasons for 
their actions to others and thereby allows others to understand 
them. Insofar as these explicit representations constitute 
commitments, others can predict their actions. Explicit 
reasoning facilitates social coordination in which social 
norms, institutions, and knowledge (as well as myths and 
confabulations) figure in control of individual actions. They 
also allow individuals to exert some control over other agents 
or social groups.  
As powerful as social control is over individual behavior, 
individuals still make decisions as to what norms and 
information to accept from their society or borrow from 
others. Most individuals follow the norms of their society, but 
all societies witness dissenters. Understanding the 
heterarchical, distributed nature of decision provides some 
insight into this process. The decision to adopt one set of 
evaluative norms rather than another relies on the more basic, 
highly-distributed, heterarchically-organized decision 
mechanisms embodied in humans as a result of evolution, 
development, and prior social and cultural engagement. Once 
adopted, control mechanisms trafficking in explicitly 
represented norms, knowledge, and myths act on other 
control mechanisms, resulting often in them also making 
decisions in accord with these explicit representations. When 
explicit norms and knowledge succeed in controlling other 
decision-making mechanisms, individuals end up acting in 
accordance with the norms of society; when they fail to do 
so, individuals act in violation of these norms.  
We recognize, therefore, that in explicit decision-making 
humans can rise above their biological endowments, drawing 
upon specialized capacities made possible by the frontal 
cortex that enable them to be affected by their society and 
culture. We insist, however, that humans do so only to a 
limited extent and that much of their decision-making relies 
on a multitude of decision-mechanisms located outside the 
frontal cortex and shared with other animals. Moreover, even 
in our distinctively human decision-making, we rely on these 
more basic mechanisms in selecting, adopting, and acting on 
explicit norms.    
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